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Can we express every transfinite concept 
constructively? 
Bhupinder Singh Anand 
In a forthcoming book, professional computer scientist and physicist Paul 
Budnik presents an exposition of classical mathematical theory as the 
backdrop to an elegant thesis: we can interpret any model of a formal system 
of Peano Arithmetic in an appropriate, digital, computational language. In this 
paper we attempt - without addressing the question of whether or not Budnik 
succeeds in establishing his thesis convincingly - to identify dogmas of 
standard interpretations of classical mathematical theory that appear to be 
implicit in Budnik’s exposition, and to correspond to them dogmas of a 
constructive interpretation of classical theory. 
1. Introduction 
In the on-line preprint of “What is and what will be: Integrating spirituality and science”, 
Budnik [Bu01] presents an exposition of classical mathematical theory as the backdrop to 
an elegant thesis: we can interpret any model of a formal system of Peano Arithmetic in 
an appropriate, digital, computational language. 
1.1  Budnik’s Thesis accepts standard interpretations of classical theory 
Loosely speaking, Budnik’s thesis is that all classically defined infinite, and transfinite, 
mathematical concepts and processes can be defined constructively, in terms of finite, 
non-terminating, digital programs, and their computations, respectively. 
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Obviously, Budnik’s arguments are based, firstly, on accepting standard interpretations of 
classical mathematical concepts and assertions; and, secondly, on showing that the latter 
can be interpreted within a finite computational language. As we argue below, the full 
significance of the paradoxical constructivity - in the sense of the effective representation 
of transfinite concepts under a denumerable interpretation - which is implicit in Budnik’s 
thesis, is not, however, immediately obvious. 
1.2  Standard interpretations of foundational concepts may be ambiguous 
We note, firstly, that, as is implicit in Mendelson’s [Me90] following remarks (italicised 
parenthetical qualifications added), standard interpretations of classical foundational 
concepts can be argued as being either ambiguous, or non-constructive, or both: 
Here is the main conclusion I wish to draw: it is completely unwarranted to say that 
CT (Church’s Thesis) is unprovable just because it states an equivalence between a 
vague, imprecise notion (effectively computable function) and a precise mathematical 
notion (partial-recursive function). ... The concepts and assumptions that support the 
notion of partial-recursive function are, in an essential way, no less vague and 
imprecise (non-constructive, and intuitionistically objectionable) than the notion of 
effectively computable function; the former are just more familiar and are part of a 
respectable theory with connections to other parts of logic and mathematics. (The 
notion of effectively computable function could have been incorporated into an 
axiomatic presentation of classical mathematics, but the acceptance of CT made this 
unnecessary.) ... Functions are defined in terms of sets, but the concept of set is no 
clearer (not more non-constructive, and intuitionistically objectionable) than that of 
function and a foundation of mathematics can be based on a theory using function as 
primitive notion instead of set. Tarski's definition of truth is formulated in set-
theoretic terms, but the notion of set is no clearer (not more non-constructive, and 
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intuitionistically objectionable), than that of truth. The model-theoretic definition of 
logical validity is based ultimately on set theory, the foundations of which are no 
clearer (not more non-constructive, and intuitionistically objectionable) than our 
intuitive (non-constructive, and intuitionistically objectionable) understanding of 
logical validity. ... The notion of Turing-computable function is no clearer (not more 
non-constructive, and intuitionistically objectionable) than, nor more mathematically 
useful (foundationally speaking) than, the notion of an effectively computable 
function. 
The questions thus arise: Could the seemingly paradoxical nature of Budnik’s thesis be 
due to ambiguities that are rooted in the standard interpretations of classical foundational 
concepts such as "mathematical object", "effective computability", "truth of a 
formula under an interpretation", "set", "Church's Thesis" etc.; ambiguities that may, 
moreover, admit non-constructive interpretations by default? Does Budnik’s thesis imply 
that we can make these concepts unambiguous, and constructive, in an intuitionistically 
unobjectionable way? 
1.3  Can classical concepts be defined constructively? 
In Anand [An02c], we argue that we can, indeed, define these concepts constructively in 
terms of a smaller number of primitive, formally undefined but intuitively 
unobjectionable, mathematical terms as below: 
(i) Primitive mathematical object: A primitive mathematical object is any symbol 
for an individual constant, predicate letter, or a function letter, which is defined as a 
primitive symbol of a formal mathematical language.1 
                                               
1 We note that, as remarked by Mendelson [Me90], the terms “function” and “function letter” - and, 
presumably, “individual constant”, “predicate”, and “predicate letter” - can be taken as undefined, primitive 
foundational concepts. 
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(ii) Formal mathematical object: A formal mathematical object is any symbol for an 
individual constant, predicate letter, or a function letter that is either a primitive 
mathematical object, or that can be introduced through definition into a formal 
mathematical language without inviting inconsistency.2 
(iii) Mathematical object: A mathematical object is any symbol that is either a 
primitive mathematical object, or a formal mathematical object. 
(iv) Set: A set is the range of any function whose function letter is a mathematical 
object. 
(v) Individual computability: A number-theoretic function F(x) is individually 
computable if, and only if, given any natural number k, there is an individually 
effective method (which may depend on the value k) to compute F(k). 
(vi) Uniform computability: A number-theoretic function F(x) is uniformly 
computable if, and only if, there is a uniformly effective method (necessarily 
independent of x)  such that, given any natural number k, it can compute F(k). 
(vii) Effective computability: A number-theoretic function is effectively computable 
if, and only if, it is either individually computable, or it is uniformly computable.3 
(viii) Individual truth: A string [F(x)]4 of a formal system P is individually true 
under an interpretation M of P if, and only if, given any value k in M, there is an 
                                               
2 We highlight the significance of this definition in Meta-lemma 1 in Anand [An02c]. 
 
3 We note that classical definitions of the effective computability of a function (cf. [Me64], p207) do not 
distinguish between the two cases. The standard interpretation of effective computability is to implicitly 
treat it as equivalent to the assertion: A number-theoretic function F(x)] of a formal system P is effectively 
computable if, and only if, it is both individually computable, and uniformly computable. 
 
4 We use square brackets to distinguish between the uninterpreted string [F] of a formal system, and the 
symbolic expression “F” that corresponds to it under a given interpretation that unambiguously assigns 
formal, or intuitive, meanings to each individual symbol of the expression “F”. 
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individually effective method (which may depend on the value k) to determine that 
the interpreted proposition F(k) is satisfied in M.5 
(ix) Uniform truth: A string [F(x)] of a formal system P is uniformly true under an 
interpretation M of P if, and only if, there is a uniformly effective method (necessarily 
independent of x) such that, given any value k in M, it can determine that the 
interpreted proposition F(k) is satisfied in M. 
(x) Effective truth: A string [F(x)] of a formal system P is effectively true under an 
interpretation M of P if, and only if, it is either individually true in M, or it is 
uniformly true in M.6 
(xi) Individual Church Thesis: If, for a given relation R(x), and any element k in 
some interpretation M of a formal system P, there is an individually effective method 
such that it will determine whether R(k) holds in M or not, then every element of the 
domain D of M is the interpretation of some term of P, and there is some P-formula 
[R'(x)] such that: 
R(k) holds in M if, and only if, [R'(k)] is P-provable. 
(In other words, the Individual Church Thesis postulates that, if a relation R is 
effectively decidable individually (possibly non-algorithmically) in an interpretation 
M of some formal system P, then R is expressible in P, and its domain necessarily 
                                               
5 In Anand [An02c], we argue that, under a constructive interpretation of formal Peano Arithmetic, Gödel’s 
undecidable proposition, is individually, but not uniformly, true under the standard interpretation. See also 
Anand [An03d]. 
 
6 We note that, classically, Tarski’s definition of the truth of a formal proposition under an interpretation 
(cf. [Me64], p49-52) does not distinguish between the two cases. The implicitly accepted (standard) 
interpretation of the definition appears, prima facie, to be the non-constructive assertion: A string [F(x)] of 
a formal system P is true under an interpretation M of P if, and only if, it is both uniformly true in M, and 
individually true in M. 
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consists of only mathematical objects, even if the predicate letter R is not, itself, a 
mathematical object.) 
(xii) Uniform Church Thesis: If, in some interpretation M of a formal system P, 
there is a uniformly effective method such that, for a given relation R(x), and any 
element k in M, it will determine whether R(k) holds in M or not, then R(x) is the 
interpretation in M of a P-formula [R(x)], and: 
   R(k) holds in M if, and only if, [R(k)] is P-provable. 
(Thus, the Uniform Church Thesis postulates that, if a relation R is effectively 
decidable uniformly (necessarily algorithmically) in an interpretation M of a formal 
system P, then, firstly, R is expressible in P, and, secondly, the predicate letter R, and 
all the elements in the domain of the relation R, are necessarily mathematical objects.) 
1.4  Standard interpretations may admit ambiguity 
As we then argue, the non-constructivity in standard interpretations of foundational 
concepts may simply reflect, and result from, the non-specification of an effective 
method for determining that the infinity of intuitive assertions, which are implicit in 
Tarski’s definition of the truth of a formula of a formal system under an interpretation, 
are, indeed, individually verifiable.  
Thus, Tarski’s definitions may be seen as implicitly implying, firstly, that relationships 
may exist only Platonically between the abstract elements of the domain of some model 
M, since there is no assurance that every such element is constructively definable, or 
representable, in every model M of PA; and, secondly, that even when such relationships, 
in some cases, are asserted as holding in M intuitively, this may not be in any effectively 
verifiable manner. 
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Clearly, what we see here is the thin end of the wedge that keeps the door ajar for the 
entry of non-constructive, Platonic, elements into the standard interpretations of classical 
theories; elements that can then be interpreted ambiguously - often creating a 
mathematical tower of babel containing frustrated purists, and confused neophytes! 
1.5  Reducing Tarskian truth and satisfiability to provability 
However, if we introduce the concept of effective truth, based on effective methods of 
verification as suggested above, then we effectively reduce any verifiable truth in the 
model M to provability in PA. In other words, what such constructive definitions and 
theses essentially suggest is that, in order to make Tarski’s definitions of truth and 
satisfiability effectively verifiable in any model M of PA, we should be able to argue that: 
(i) If a string [R(x)] is PA-provable, then its interpretation R(x) in M is both 
individually true and uniformly true; hence, viewed as a Boolean function, R(x) is 
Turing-computable. 
(ii) If a string [R(n)] is PA-provable for any given numeral [n], then the interpretation 
R(x) in M is either individually true or uniformly true; hence, viewed as a Boolean 
function, R(x) is not necessarily Turing-computable. 
(iii) If R(x) is individually true in M (which we may express as (Ix)R(x)), then, R(x) 
is expressible (cf. [Me64], p117, §2) in PA; hence every element of the domain of M 
is the interpretation of  some term of PA. 
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(iv) Uniform Turing Thesis7: If R(x) is uniformly true in M (which we may express as 
(Ux)R(x)), then [R(x)] is PA-provable; hence, viewed as a Boolean function, R(x) is 
Turing-computable. 
Now, whilst (i), and (ii), seem, prima facie, consistent with standard interpretations of 
Tarski’s definitions, (iii) clearly does not follow from them; however, as the Löwenheim-
Skolem theorem ([Me64], p69, Corollary 2.16) suggests, it may not be inconsistent with 
such interpretations. It is not obvious whether (iv) is independent of, equivalent to, or a 
consequence of the Individual and Uniform Church Theses. 
1.6  Some consequences of a constructive interpretation 
Now, the significance of constructively interpreting foundational concepts and assertions 
of classical mathematics is that: 
(i) The Uniform Church Thesis implies that a formula [R] is P-provable if, and only 
if, [R] is uniformly true in some interpretation M of P. 
(ii) The Uniform Church Thesis implies that if a number-theoretic relation R(x) is 
uniformly satisfied in some interpretation M of P, then the predicate letter “R” is a 
formal mathematical object in P (i.e. it can be introduced through definition into P 
without inviting inconsistency). 
(iii) The Uniform Church Thesis implies that, if a P-formula [R] is uniformly true in 
some interpretation M of P, then [R] is uniformly true in every model of P. 
                                               
7 We introduce an equivalent statement of this as an independent Quantum Halting Hypothesis in Anand 
[An02d], where we show that such a thesis allows us to model a deterministic universe that is essentially 
unpredictable. 
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(iv) The Uniform Church Thesis implies that if a formula [R] is not P-provable, but 
[R] is classically true under the standard interpretation, then [R] is individually true, 
but not uniformly true, in the standard model of P. 
(v) The Uniform Church Thesis implies that Gödel’s undecidable sentence GUS is 
individually true, but not uniformly true, in the standard model of P.8 
By defining effective computability, both individually and uniformly, along similar lines, 
we can give a constructive definition of uncomputable number-theoretic functions: 
(vi) A number-theoretic function F(x1, ..., xn) in the standard interpretation M of P is 
uncomputable if, and only if, it is effectively computable individually, but not 
effectively computable uniformly. 
This, last, removes the mysticism behind the fact that we can constructively define a 
number-theoretic Halting function that is, paradoxically, Turing-uncomputable. 
(vii) If we assume a Uniform Church Thesis, then every partial recursive number-
theoretic function F(x1, ..., xn) has a unique constructive extension as a total function. 
(viii) If we assume a Uniform Church Thesis, then not every effectively computable 
function is classically Turing computable (so Turing’s Thesis does not, then, hold). 
(ix) If we assume a Uniform Church Thesis, then not every (partially) recursive 
function is classically Turing-computable.9 
                                               
8 An intriguing consequence of this argument is considered in Appendix 1 of Anand [An03c]. 
 
9 The classical proof that every (partially) recursive function is classically Turing-computable uses 
induction over (partial) recursive functions, thus assuming that every such function is a mathematical 
object; by Meta-lemma 1, such an assumption is invalid. 
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(x) If we assume a Uniform Church Thesis, then the class P of polynomial-time 
languages in the P versus NP problem may not define a formal mathematical object. 
Further, since a number-theoretic relation is expressible in P if, and only if, it is recursive 
([Me64], p142, Corollary 3.29), it follows, as Mendelson argues, that the classical 
Church’s Thesis can, indeed, be viewed as: 
(xi) Church’s Theorem: The Individual Church Thesis implies that a number-theoretic 
function is effectively computable if, and only if, it is recursive10. 
1.7  Defining formal, constructive and Platonic concepts 
Essentially, a constructive interpretation of classical mathematical concepts recognises 
that, since Anand ([An02c], Meta-theorem 1) proves constructively that not every, 
effectively well-defined, classical, mathematical concept is formalisable in its intuitive 
entirety, we do not need to treat every non-formalisable mathematical concept as 
necessarily Platonic, and so outside the reach of effective methods. Ipso facto, we can 
distinguish between: 
(i) formalisable mathematical concepts (such as arithmetical functions and relations) 
that are within the ambit of formal effective methods (provability), 
(ii) non-formalisable mathematical concepts (such as recursive number-theoretic 
functions and relations) that are within the ambit of non-formal effective methods 
(effective truth), and 
                                               
10 We note that the classical Church Thesis is the assertion: “A number-theoretic function is effectively 
computable if, and only if, it is recursive” (cf. [Me64], p227). 
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(iii) mathematical concepts that are essentially unverifiable by any effective method, 
and which implicitly assume the existence of a non-constructive Platonic oracle of 
intuitive truth. 
2. A professional scientist’s view of classical mathematical 
dogmas 
The questions arise: What is the relationship between the non-constructive standard 
interpretations of classical mathematical theory, Budnik’s thesis, and a constructive 
interpretation of classical mathematical concepts along the above lines? Is a constructive 
interpretation of classical mathematical theory consistent with Budnik’s thesis? Is 
Budnik’s thesis consistent with the non-constructivity of standard dogmas? Are classical 
non-constructive mathematical dogmas consistent with a constructive interpretation of 
classical mathematical theory? 
2.1  A constructive thesis 
Now, as we note in Anand [An03e]: 
Increasingly, the major challenges of Theoretical Computer Science, Quantum 
Physics, and other disciplines are, prima facie, to express what appear to be non-
algorithmic, but determinate, processes; such processes seem to characterise natural 
laws more than classical algorithmic processes. However, the implicit thesis of 
standard interpretations of classical theory - reflected in the broad acceptance of CT - 
that such phenomena are essentially inaccessible to effective methods of expression 
seems, prima facie, to go against the growing body of experimental evidence to the 
contrary11. 
                                               
11 In his 2003 BBC Reith lectures, Ramachandran speculates that it may be possible, at some future date, to 
map, and physically link, the cognitive parts of one brain into another, so the latter can mirror the former’s 
sensory perceptions as identically sensed experiences. 
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As we also note, in Anand [An03c]: 
... the central issue in the development of AI is that of finding effective methods of 
duplicating the cognitive and expressive processes of the human mind. This issue is 
being increasingly brought into sharper focus by the rapid advances in the 
experimental, behavioral, and computer sciences12. Penrose’s “The Emperor’s New 
Mind”, and “Shadows of the Mind”, highlight what is striking about the attempts, and 
struggles, of current work in these areas to express their observations adequately -
necessarily in a predictable way - within the standard interpretations of formal 
propositions as offered by classical theory. 
So, the question arises: Are formal classical theories essentially unable to adequately 
express the extent and range of human cognition, or does the problem lie in the way 
formal theories are classically interpreted at the moment? The former addresses the 
question of whether there are absolute limits on our capacity to express human 
cognition unambiguously; the latter, whether there are only temporal limits - not 
necessarily absolute - to the capacity of classical interpretations to communicate 
unambiguously that which we intended to capture within our formal expression. 
The thesis of this, and related, papers13 is, then, that we may comfortably reject the 
former by recognising, firstly, that we can, indeed, constructively define foundational 
concepts unambiguously as indicated above; and, secondly, that, appearances to the 
contrary, all set-theoretic concepts should be capable of constructive interpretations 
without any loss of generality. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
12 See, for instance, footnote 18 in Ramachandran.[RH01]. 
 
13 See Anand, in particular [An02c], [An02d], [An03a], [An03b], [An03c], [An03d], and [An03e]. 
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2.2  Can standard dogmas constrain the expression of professional scientists? 
Of relevance to such a constructive thesis would be the related question: To what extent, 
if any, would the expressibility of the intuitive mathematical concepts of a professional 
scientist, such as Budnik, be influenced, and significantly constrained, by standard 
mathematical dogmas?  
Without addressing the issue of whether or not Budnik succeeds in establishing his thesis 
convincingly, or seeking definitive conclusions, we therefore attempt, in the Appendix 
below, to identify standard dogmas (SD) of accepted interpretations of classical 
mathematical theory that appear to be implicit in Budnik’s exposition (BE)14, and to 
contrast them with corresponding dogmas of a constructive interpretation (CI) as above.  
We also try to indicate where, why, or how, standard dogmas may be deemed 
questionable, on the grounds of possible ambiguity, from a constructive point of view.  
Appendix: Budnik’s exposition, standard dogmas, and 
constructive interpretations. 
A. Introduction: What is and what will be: Integrating spirituality and 
science: A book about mathematics, physics and spirituality. 
A1.  Mathematics and the infinite 
BE: ...mathematics is a fundamentally creative process in a finite but perhaps 
potentially infinite universe. ...mathematics can be extended in light of the limitations 
implied by Godel's theorem.  
                                               
14 We consider only the Chapters from Budnik ([Bu01], Preface) upto Budnik ([Bu01], A philosophy of 
mathematical truth) 
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(1) SD: Mathematics is a process.  
CI: Mathematics is a language. 
(2) SD: Goedel’s theorem imposes limitations.  
CI: Languages may be limited in their capacity to express concepts that are not 
definable within their existing vocabulary; they cannot, however, impose absolute 
limitations on the expression of such concepts within an expanded vocabulary. 
B. Structure and essence: The keys to integrating spirituality and 
science 
B1.  Consciousness is finite 
BE: ...all conscious experience and thus physical structure has a logical or 
mathematical finite structure.  
SD: All conscious experience has a logical or mathematical finite structure. 
CI: Sensory experience is itself a non-mathematical language of internal 
expression, which is translated and communicated to others in languages of 
external expression such as literature, mathematics, art, computer programming, 
etc. All communication is implicitly finite by definition, though it may be 
expressed in a language that is open-ended as to any, or all, of its symbolic 
expressions. 
B2.  Levels of structure and consciousness 
BE: ... Mathematics can help us understand ...ever more subtle and complex levels of 
self-reflection ...in mathematical hierarchies of iteration or self-reflection. 
 15
An implication of Gödel's famous proof of the incompleteness of mathematics is the 
absence of any single finite formulation that can capture the potentially unlimited 
levels of ever more powerful forms of self reflection that can exist in a mathematical 
system.  
(1) SD: Mathematics can help us understand sensory perceptions better. 
CI: Mathematics expresses, in a language of external expression, that which we 
individually perceive through our senses in our internal languages of self-
expression. By definition, translation cannot add to the content of that which is 
sought to be communicated; in other words, translation cannot add insight, it can 
only reflect it. 
(2) SD: Gödel has shown that there are intuitive mathematical concepts that cannot 
be expressed formally. 
CI: The intuitive mathematical concepts referred to in Gödel's argument are not 
expressible formally simply because, classically, they are defined ambiguously. 
Removing the ambiguity removes the inability. Davis [Da95] makes the point, in 
his remarks on Penrose’s thesis, that Gödel's reasoning does not appeal to any 
intuitive insight that is not defined formally (even if ambiguously!).  
C. Immediate experience and existence 
C1.  The essence of experience 
BE: The only fundamental entity in set theory is the empty set or nothing at all. All 
other objects are built up from the empty set. 
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SD: All well-defined mathematical entities15 are sets. 
CI: Russell’s non-constructive set of all sets that are not members of themselves 
shows that treating a set as a primitive concept leads to a paradox; hence the 
notion of a well-defined mathematical entity as necessarily being a set is 
ambiguous under interpretation. It is false even when we restrict the notion of a 
set to that of any interpreted object of an Axiomatic Set Theory such as ZFC; we 
can define constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, mathematical 
entities16 that are not sets Anand ([An02c], Corollary 1.2). 
C2.  Structure and essence 
BE: The distinction between structure and essence is unnatural. ...science and analysis 
only applies to structure and never to essence.  
SD: Our perception of external objects contains elements that are extraneous to 
the mathematical structure of the object. Hence science and analysis only applies 
to structure, and never to essence. 
CI: Unless we accept an actualised Platonic existence for external objects, we 
cannot treat sensory experiences as indication of a permanent, unchanging, 
essence whose structure is perceivable identically by different observers who are 
separated in space-time. Seemingly common factors that indicate the presence of 
an essence that lies beyond sensory experiences may simply reflect those aspects 
                                               
15 By a mathematical entity, we mean anything that can be intuitively defined as a possible (in the sense of 
unactualised) individual entity (eg. the smallest odd number divisible by two); or a function, or relation, 
between such, possible, individual entities. 
 
16 The precise definitions of a “mathematical object” and a “set” remove the paradoxical element in the 
logical and semantic antinomies: these arguments define mathematical entities that are not mathematical 
objects. 
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of the structure that are locationally less sensitive relatively, but not necessarily 
absolutely. 
C3.  The finite and the infinite 
BE(a): There may be two classes of existence. The first is immediate gestalt 
experience. The second is the collection of all such experiences. This collection may 
be infinite and is not itself an immediate gestalt experience. Mathematics already has 
such a distinction between sets and classes.  
SD: Classes are intuitive mathematical objects, whilst sets are formal 
mathematical objects. 
CI: Whilst sets are formally well-defined mathematical objects, classes are 
formally well-defined mathematical entities; however, every class is not 
necessarily a mathematical object. The distinction can be expressed 
constructively. Given a domain of mathematical objects, the existence of a set 
implies that there is a uniformly effective method that determines whether any 
given object of the domain is a member of the set or not; however, the existence 
of a class only implies that, given any object of the domain, there is an 
individually effective method that determines whether it is a member of the class 
or not. There may not be any uniformly effective method that determines whether 
any given object of the domain is a member of the class or not. 
BE(b): As mathematics is the study of all possible logical structures it is also the 
study of the structure of all possible gestalts. 
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SD: Mathematics is the study of all possible gestalts. 
CI: A gestalt is, itself, an expression in an internal language of sensory 
perceptions. Mathematics is an external language into which we translate a 
gestalt. 
C4.  Mathematics 
BE(a): Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem implies that there is no finite limit to the 
levels of subtle self reflection in finite systems. 
SD: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem implies that we can add the undecidable 
proposition of a formal system as an axiom to define a “richer” formal system ad 
infinitum. 
CI: We cannot add an undecidable proposition of a formal system as an axiom 
without inviting inconsistency17. A constructive interpretation of Gödel's 
Incompleteness Theorem is that it defines a constructive18, and intuitionistically 
unobjectionable, mathematical entity that is not a mathematical object. 
BE(b): Mathematics then and now is based on formal systems. In effect these are 
mechanistic processes or computer programs for enumerating theorems.  
SD: Every well-defined mathematical concept can be expressed within a formal 
system. 
                                               
17 This is a consequence of Meta-lemma 1 in Anand [An02c], and of Meta-theorem 1 in Anand [An02b]. 
 
18 This constructivity differentiates Gödel's definition from the non-constructive definitions involved in 
various semantic, logical and mathematical antinomies. 
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CI: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem shows that there are constructive, and 
intuitionistically unobjectionable, mathematical entities that are not definable 
within a formal system.  
BE(c): Gödel proved that any consistent formal system powerful enough to define the 
primitive recursive functions had statements in the system that could not be decided 
within the system.  
SD: Gödel proved that any formal system of Arithmetic is powerful enough to 
define the primitive recursive functions. 
CI: Gödel’s reasoning can be constructively interpreted as proving ([An02c], 
Corollary 1.1) that every primitive recursive relation cannot be introduced 
through definition into a formal system of Peano Arithmetic without inviting 
inconsistency.  
BE(d): The primitive recursive functions are a fragment of elementary mathematics 
powerful enough to define a Universal Turing Machine. 
SD: A function is Turing-computable if, and only if, it is partial recursive. 
CI: There are primitive recursive functions that are not computable by any 
uniformly effective method; hence they are not Turing-computable ([An02c], 
Corollary 9.2).  
C5.  Hierarchies of truth and decidability 
BE (a): There is nothing special about halting. We get an equivalent problem when 
we ask if the computer program will ever accept more inputs. No doubt you have 
experienced this problem while waiting for a response from your computer. You 
never know if it requires rebooting or will eventually respond. 
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SD: Predicting whether a computer program will “hang” is equivalent to 
predicting whether a classical Turing machine will halt. 
CI: The two are not equivalent. Given a particular program, and a specific input, 
any computer can be meta-programmed to effectively recognise any looping 
situation - i.e. when the computer “hangs” - and to meta-terminate the 
computation. However, it cannot be programmed to recognise a non-terminating 
computation. 
BE (b): The halting problem is at the first level of an unlimited hierarchy of 
unsolvable problems. 
SD: The halting problem is effectively unsolvable. 
CI: The halting problem is effectively solvable if we assume a Uniform Church 
Thesis.  
D. What is and what will be: Integrating spirituality and science  
D1.  Preface  
BE (a): ... infinity is a limit that can never be reached. ... In the language of 
mathematics there is no completed infinite totality. 
SD: An infinite set is a completed infinite totality. 
CI: Infinity is an adjective that is applied to an effective, non-terminating, process 
that, by definition, is essentially incomplete. However, some non-terminating 
processes, eg. Cauchy sequences, can still be well-defined mathematical objects. 
BE (b): Mathematics is a key to understanding the framework of the creative process. 
Through Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem we know that the creative evolution of 
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structure can never be captured in finite form. ... There is a hierarchy of mathematical 
truth that characterizes levels of abstraction or self-reflection such as the self 
reflection that is a defining characteristic of human consciousness. Gödel proved that 
this hierarchy can not be finitely described.  
(1) SD: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem shows that there are models of standard PA 
with elements that cannot be completely expressed within standard PA. 
CI: Every model of PA is a language that is equivalent to PA in its expressibility.  
(2) SD: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem shows that there is an infinite hierarchy of 
models of PA and a corresponding, infinite, hierarchy of PA-unverifiable intuitive 
truths. 
CI: All intuitive truth must necessarily be effectively verifiable in PA. 
BE (c): Gödel's result was and remains a shock to the mathematical community that 
sees mathematical truth as the one absolute certainty in a confusing world. ... By 
asserting the existence of complex infinite sets one can indirectly define levels in the 
hierarchy of mathematical truth that are difficult to approach in other ways. This 
suggests to some that mathematical intuition can transcend the limits Gödel's theorem 
imposes on any single path approach to extending mathematics. ... We argue that 
there are more powerful approaches to exploring mathematical truth that have no 
need to transcend the limits of Gödel's theorem with mystical intuition. 
(1) SD: Gödel's result was and remains a shock to the mathematical community, 
since it asserts that mathematical truth is effectively unverifiable. 
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CI: The standard interpretation of Gödel's result was, and remains, a shock to the 
mathematical community, since it asserts that, contrary to our mathematical 
intuition, mathematical truth can be effectively unverifiable. 
(2) SD: We can use mathematical intuition to assert the existence of complex infinite 
sets, and indirectly define levels in the hierarchy of mathematical truth that 
transcend the limits Gödel's theorem imposes on mathematics. 
CI: Corollary 1.1 of Anand [An02c] proves that we cannot use an axiomatic set 
theory, such as ZFC, to assert the existence of complex infinite sets without 
risking inconsistency. Hence an axiomatisation such as ZFC is not a model for, 
nor does it, therefore, reflect, our mathematical intuition as formalised in standard 
PA19.  
D2.  Essence as a Platonic ideal  
BE (a): ... Unlike Euclidean geometry, contemporary mathematics has no primitive 
objects with innate properties. ... Mathematical captures the mathematical properties 
of the ideal circle as an abstract structure.  
SD: Mathematics expresses the mathematical properties of Platonic ideals, such 
as a circle, that are capable of being defined as mathematical concepts. 
CI: Mathematics can only express mathematical properties of mathematical 
concepts, such as a circle, that are mathematical objects. 
BE (b): Mathematics avoids making implicit assumptions by limiting itself to one 
primitive entity, the empty set, with no structure of its own. 
                                               
19 In contrast, standard interpretations of classical theory assert ZFC as a consistent (by definition) model of 
a formal system such as standard PA ([Me64], p192-3). 
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SD: All mathematics concepts, defined in terms of the empty set as a primitive 
mathematical object, are mathematical objects. 
CI: Corollary 1.1 of Anand [An02c] proves that not all mathematics concepts, 
defined in terms of the empty set as a primitive mathematical object, are 
mathematical objects. 
D3.   Structure in computing and mathematics 
BE: In the 1930's there were a number of proposals to define mechanistic calculation. 
The idea was to characterize those functions that could be calculated by following 
exact rules. All of the major contenders turned out to be equivalent. They all could 
generate the same set of functions. ... Church's Thesis implies that the functions 
computable by a Universal Turing Machine fully characterize what we mean by 
effectively or mechanistically computable. This conjecture is almost universally 
accepted. 
(1) SD: Mechanistic calculations that evaluate functions by following exact rules are 
necessarily algorithmic. 
CI: Gödel's “undecidable” proposition, [(Ax)R(x)], defines an arithmetical 
relation R(n) which, treated as a Boolean function, cannot be evaluated 
algorithmically, but which can be effectively computed mechanically for any 
given natural number n. 
(2) SD: All the known mathematically defined methods of effectively computing a 
number-theoretic function are equivalent. 
CI: All the known mathematically defined methods of effectively computing a 
number-theoretic function algorithmically are equivalent. 
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(3) SD: Turing's Thesis, that the functions computable by a Universal Turing 
Machine fully characterize what we mean by effectively or mechanistically 
computable, is probably true. 
CI: Corollary 14.2 of Anand [An02c] proves that there are effectively computable 
functions that are not classically Turing-computable. Hence the Turing Thesis is 
false. 
(4) SD: Church’s Thesis is equivalent to Turing's Thesis. 
CI: The Individual Church Thesis ([An02c], §5.2), implies that the classical 
Church Thesis is a theorem. Hence, it does not imply the Turing Thesis (Corollary 
14.3 of [An02c]). 
D4.  Gödel and unfathomable complexity  
BE (a): Gödel proved that any consistent formal system powerful enough to define 
the primitive recursive functions had statements in the system that could not be 
decided within the system. 
SD: Gödel proved that there were mathematical assertions that could not be 
decided with certainty. 
CI: Gödel proved that there was a class of mathematical assertions that could not 
be decided with certainty by a uniform method collectively, but any given 
assertion of the class could be decided with certainty individually. 
BE (b): There will always be programs that have some subtle way to loop or iterate 
that are beyond our current understanding.  
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SD: We can constructively define a number-theoretic function WillHalt(n) that is 
0 if the Turing machine T(n), whose Gödel-number is n, halts, and 1 if it does not. 
WillHalt(n) is not Turing computable. Hence, any Turing machine that computes 
WillHalt(n) will loop or iterate in some subtle way that is beyond our current 
understanding. 
CI: Any Turing machine can be meta-programmed to recognise, and halt, any 
looping situation. The Uniform Church Thesis ([An02c], §5.2) implies that a 
parallel duo of Turing machines will evaluate WillHalt(n) for any given n 
(([An02c], Corollary 14.1). 
D5.  All that exists is finite  
BE (a): ... Mathematics already has such a distinction between sets and classes.  
SD: A set is any element in the domain of an axiomatic set theory that contains a 
separation axiom or its equivalent. A class is any arbitrary collection of sets. 
CI: A class is the range of any, constructively well-defined, function. A set is the 
range of any, constructively well-defined, function whose function letter is a 
mathematical object. The separation axiom introduces inconsistency into an 
axiomatic set theory such as ZFC ([An02c], Corollary 1.1). 
BE (b): In mathematics the unifying relationship is set membership. Everything is a 
set and all relationships are determined by set membership. A set is an arbitrary 
collection of other sets. 
SD: Every mathematical concept can be defined as a set in some axiomatic set 
theory, or in one of its extensions. 
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CI: Corollary 1.1 in [An02c] proves that not every mathematical concept can be 
defined as a set in an axiomatic set theory that is a model of PA. 
D6.  Mathematical structure  
BE (a): Mathematics is taught as absolute truth. ... Yet Gödel proved in the 1930's 
that Mathematics cannot be captured in any finite system. 
SD: Gödel proved that, in any formal system of Arithmetic that models standard 
PA, there are arithmetical assertions that are true under the standard 
interpretation, but which cannot be proven formally. 
CI: Gödel proved that, in any formal system of Arithmetic that models standard 
PA, there are arithmetical assertions that cannot be asserted as uniformly true 
collectively under the standard interpretation, but which can be proven 
individually true separatey under such interpretation. 
D7.  Logically determined unsolvable problems  
BE (a): Logically determined unsolvable problems exist because one can ask if a 
property is true for any or all integers. For example the Halting Problem asks if a 
computer program will halt at any future time. 
SD: The Halting predicate is a well-defined number-theoretic relation that is not 
effectively verifiable. 
CI: Every well-defined number-theoretic relation is effectively verifiable 
individually. 
BE (b): The next level in the hierarchy of unsolvable problems asks if a program has 
an infinite number of outputs an infinite subset of which encode a computer program 
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that itself has an infinite number of outputs. This method of defining higher levels of 
unsolvable problems can be iterated and generalized in obvious and very complex 
non obvious ways. 
SD: There is a hierarchy of unsolvable arithmetical assertions. 
CI: The use of the term “unsolvable” is misleading. Following the convention 
implicitly set by Turing [Tu36], we may define uncomputable number-theoretic 
functions (cf. [An02c], Def. 6(viii)) as those that cannot be evaluated uniformly 
for all values in the range of the function, but which can be evaluated 
individually. 
D8.  Formal logic  
BE (a): If a logical expression contains quantifiers than we need to evaluate a logical 
relationship over a range of values to determine the truth of the expression. If the 
range is infinite then there is no general way to evaluate the expression.  
SD: There is no effective method to determine the truth of an expression where the 
domain of the quantifier is infinite. 
CI: Gödel has proved that if a logical relation is expressible formally, there is 
always an effective method to determine the truth of the expression for any given 
set of values of its free variables, even if there is no general way to evaluate the 
expression. 
BE (b): We can use induction to prove that some statements hold for all integers but 
for that we need to go beyond logic to mathematics. 
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SD: Logic and mathematics are distinctly different disciplines. 
CI: Mathematics is a symbolic language, and logic is the alphabet, grammar, 
axioms and rules of inference used to effectively assign truth values to effectively 
defined well-formed expressions of the language.  
D9.  Formal mathematics  
BE(a): Formal mathematics ... reduces mathematical relationships to questions of set 
membership. The only undefined primitive object in formal mathematics is the empty 
set that contains nothing at all. 
(1) SD: All mathematical relations can be formally defined as sets. All mathematical 
functions are sets. 
CI: A set is defined as the range of a mathematical function if, and only if, the 
function letter is a mathematical object. The range of a mathematical function 
whose function letter is not a mathematical object is a class. 
(2) SD: We can base all of formal mathematics on the undefined primitive concepts of 
a set and of set membership. 
CI: We can base all of formal mathematics on the undefined primitive concepts of 
individual terms, variables, functions, and relations. 
BE(b): The standard axioms of set theory are ... adequate for all of conventional 
mathematics. Almost every mathematical abstraction that has ever been investigated 
can be derived as a set that these axioms imply exists. Almost every mathematical 
proof ever constructed can be made assuming nothing beyond these axioms. These 
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axioms are less than a page long but no finite structure can ever capture all of 
mathematics. 
(1) SD: All mathematical concepts are sets. 
CI: There are constructively well-defined mathematical concepts that are not sets 
([An02c], Corollary 1.1). 
(2) SD: There are formal mathematical concepts that cannot be expressed within any 
mathematical language. 
CI: Every formal mathematical concept can be expressed within standard PA 
([An02c], Individual Church Thesis). 
D10.  Cardinal numbers  
BE (a): The cardinal numbers originated from Cantor's proof that there are “more” 
real numbers than integers. 
SD: Cantor’s diagonal argument defines a Dedekind real number. 
CI: We cannot assume that Cantor’s diagonal argument defines a Dedekind real 
number ([An03b], §2). 
BE(b): Cantor used a diagonalization argument to show there does not exist a 
function that assigned a unique integer to every real number. He assumed such a 
function, r(n), exists and used it to construct a real, d, not in the range of the function 
r(n). 
SD: Cantor’s diagonal argument proves that there are “more” Dedekind real 
numbers than integers. 
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CI: Cantor’s diagonal argument proves that there is no uniformly effective 
method of determining whether an effectively-defined, non-terminating, sequence 
of 0’s and 1’s, which is preceded by a decimal point, defines a Dedekind real 
number (which we axiomatically postulate, along with omega, as an “infinite” 
mathematical object). Any determination that such a sequence does, indeed, 
define a Dedekind real number can only be by an individually effective method. 
Further, even if we assume, or axiomatically postulate, that Cantor’s non-
constructive diagonal procedure defines a mathematical object, namely a 
Cantorian real number, his argument only proves that there are “more” Cantorian 
real numbers than integers. Although, under the assumption, every Dedekind real 
number (cf. [Ru53], p9, Definition 1.31) would be a Cantorian real number, the 
converse does not hold ([An03b], §2). 
BE (b): If there is a function that maps a unique integer onto each element of a set 
then that set is said to be countable. Cantor proved the reals are not countable. ... A 
real number in this range can be represented as an infinitely long decimal fraction 
with the first digit just to the right of the decimal point ... 
SD: Any non-terminating sequence of 0’s and 1’s that is preceded by a decimal 
point defines a Dedekind real number.  
CI: Every effectively-defined non-terminating sequence of 0’s and 1’s, which is 
preceded by a decimal point, does not define a Dedekind real number ([An03b], 
§2). 
BE(c): The hierarchy of cardinal numbers is of practical importance because axioms 
asserting the existence of such sets solve problems that almost everyone agrees are 
meaningful like instances of the Halting Problem. 
 31
SD: Cantor’s Theorem proves that cardinal numbers have a hierarchy. 
CI: Cantor’s Theorem ([Me64], p183, Proposition 4.23) assumes that there is a 
function G with domain as the set x, and range the power set P(x) of x ([Me64], 
p168, Axiom W), and arrives at a contradiction; it concludes that x and P(x) are 
not equinumerous ([Me64], p180, §3). However, the proof assumes implicitly that 
G is a mathematical object, which may be introduced as a function letter in the 
argument (as in Russell’s paradox); thus, we may only conclude that G cannot be 
a mathematical object. It follows that Cantor’s argument can only be taken to 
establish that there is no uniformly effective method of generating a 1-1 
correspondence between the members of x and those of P(x). 
We cannot conclude, however, that there can be no individually effective method 
that associates any given member of P(x) with a uniquely identifying Gödel-
number; on the contrary, we take the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem ([Me64], p65, 
Proposition 2.12; p80, Corollary 2.28) as implicitly implying the existence of such 
a method. 
D11.  Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem  
BE (a): Gödel proved that any formal system that defines the primitive recursive 
functions must be either incomplete or inconsistent. In particular one could not prove 
from within the system that the system itself was consistent even though the question 
could be formulated within the system. 
(1) SD: All primitive recursive functions and relations can be “embedded” in 
standard PA. 
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CI: There is a primitive recursive relation that cannot be introduced as a relation 
letter into standard PA, along with suitable defining axioms, without inviting 
inconsistency ([An02c], Meta-lemma 1). 
(2) SD: The concept “PA is consistent” can be defined mathematically, and 
expressed within PA by an equivalent PA-formula. 
CI: There is no PA formula that, under the standard interpretation, is equivalent to 
a mathematical expression of the assertion “PA is consistent” ([An02c], Meta-
theorem 2). 
BE (b): A finite formal system is a mechanistic process for deducing theorems. This 
means we can construct a computer program to generate all the theorems deducible 
from the axioms of the system.  
SD: There is a Turing machine that can determine, for any given natural number 
n, whether n is the Gödel-number of a proof sequence of standard PA. 
CI: There is no uniform effective method (Turing machine) that can determine, 
for any given natural number n, whether n is the Gödel-number of a proof 
sequence of standard PA; however, given any n, there is always some individual 
effective method that can determine whether n is the Gödel-number of a proof 
sequence of standard PA (this is a consequence of [An02c], Meta-theorem 2). 
D12.  Arithmetical Hierarchy  
BE (a): A set that we can list using a computer program is said to be recursively 
enumerable. If we can also list by a computer the complement of the set than it is said 
to be recursive. The set of Gödel numbers of computer programs that halt is 
recursively enumerable but not recursive.  
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(1) SD: The Gödel numbers of computer programs that halt can be listed by a 
computer. 
CI: The Gödel numbers of computer programs that halt cannot be listed by a 
computer. 
(2) SD: The Gödel numbers of computer programs that halt form a well-defined set. 
CI: The Gödel numbers of computer programs that halt do not form a 
mathematical object. 
BE (b): We can speculate about “more difficult” problems by assuming one had a 
solution for the halting problem and ask what new problems would remain 
unsolvable. This led to the idea of a computer with an oracle. An oracle is a magical 
device that solves some unsolvable problem like the Halting Problem. You input to it 
an integer n and in a finite time it outputs 1 or 0 to indicate if the program with Gödel 
number n will or will not halt.  
SD: We can always assume that there is a Turing oracle that will evaluate any, 
constructively well-defined, number-theoretic function on any valid input in a 
finite time. 
CI: Gödel has shown that there can be no Turing oracle Tor that will evaluate 
every constructively well-defined number-theoretic function on any valid input in 
a finite time. However, given any, constructively well-defined, number-theoretic 
function, say f(x), there is always a  Gödelian oracle (meta-proof) Gor such that, 
given any valid input k, Gor assures us that there is some individually effective 
method to evaluate f(k) in a finite time. 
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BE(c): Assuming we have a computer that has access to an oracle for the Halting 
Problem, are there functions it cannot compute? One can apply the original Halting 
Problem proof to this machine to prove it could not solve its own Halting Problem. 
One could give an oracle for this higher level Halting Problem and generate an even 
higher level problem. Thus was introduced the notion of degrees of unsolvability.  
SD: There is a hierachy of Halting problems. 
CI: The Halting problem for a Turing machine T can be effectively solved by a 
duo of Turing machines Ti//T2, operating in tandem; the duo T1//T2 is not a 
Turing machine ([An02c], Corollary 14.2). Since, by Church’s Theorem, a 
function is effectively computable if and only if it is recursive (§1.6(xi) above), 
the duo T1//T2 defines a recursive function. Since every recursive function is 
effectively computable individually, there is no Halting problem for any method 
that effectively computes a number-theoretic function. 
D13.  Axiom scheme of replacement  
BE: This axiom schema came about because previous attempts to axiomatize 
mathematics were too general and led to contradictions like the Barber Paradox.  
SD: The axiom schema of replacement is consistent with the axioms of standard 
PA. 
CI: Any set theory that models standard PA cannot contain an axiom schema of 
replacement, or its equivalent ([An02c], Corollary 1.1). 
D14.  Ordinal numbers 
BE: The Halting Problem could be solved with a function that increased rapidly 
enough. Assume a specific Gödel numbering of computer programs. For any integer 
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n there is some integer m such that all programs with Gödel number less than n that 
halt will do so in m time steps. m can be the longest time to halt for programs with 
Gödel number less than n. If we had a function m(n) that could tell us how long to 
wait we could solve the halting problem. Any function equal to or uniformly larger 
than this function will do. There is such a function that will solve problems at every 
level in the Arithmetical and Hyperarithmetical hierarchies. 
SD: There is a number-theoretic function f(x, y) such that, for any given natural 
numbers m and n, it can evaluate f(m, n) as the maximum length of all halting 
computations by Turing machines whose Gödel-numbers are less than n. 
CI: Given natural numbers m and n, there is an individually effective method that 
will evaluate the maximum length of all halting computations by Turing machines 
whose Gödel-numbers are less than n. However, the function letter f is not a 
mathematical object; hence the number-theoretic function f(x, y) is not effectively 
(Turing) computable uniformly. 
D15.  Searching all possible paths  
BE (a): Since we can enumerate (or list as outputs of a computer program) the Gödel 
numbers of all computer programs we should be able to define the ordinal that 
contains all ordinals whose structure is mirrored by the execution of a computer 
program. This would be the first non-recursive ordinal.  
SD: There is a Turing machine that can effectively determine whether a given 
natural number is the Gödel-number of a Turing machine or not. 
CI: The number-theoretic function T(n), defined as 0 if n is the Gödel-number of 
a Turing machine, and 1 if it is not, may not be effectively computable uniformly; 
hence, T(n) cannot be assumed Turing-computable. 
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BE (b): To define the first non-recursive ordinal we must specify how a computer 
program mirrors the structure of a recursive ordinal. The idea is that the outputs of the 
program correspond to the members of the set being represented. Every set except the 
empty set is represented by a program with at least one output. We can use computer 
programs with integer outputs. 0 represents the empty set. All other integer outputs 
are interpreted as Gödel numbers of computer programs. These may or may not have 
a structure that represents a set. If one of them does not then the program with that 
output cannot represent a set.  
SD: There is a Turing machine that can always determine whether the output of a 
Turing machine represents a set or not. 
CI: We cannot assume that there is a uniformly effective method that will always 
determine whether the output of a Turing machine represents a set or not. 
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